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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRANCES R. PURDIE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY of the University of
Utah, CLAUDE IV. GRANT, JOSEPH C.
BENTLEY, ROBERT E. FINLEY, ADELAIDE
FUHRIMAN, REED ~1. MERRILL, RALPH E.
PACKARD, Jfu~ES P. PAPPAS, MICHAEL
J. PATTON, and JOHN DOES I through
VII,

Case No. 15209

Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF Al'liCI CURIAE UTAH STATE COALITIO'\J OF
SENIO CITIZENS AND THE NATIONAL RETIRED TEACHERS
ASSOCIATION - AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS.

I

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Appellant (hereafter plaintiff)
initiated this action for declaratory and injunctive
relief alleging that defendants-respondants

(hereafter

defendants) invidiously discriminated against her on
the basis of her age and denied her free and equal
access to the public school system of the State of Utah
by denying her admission to a graduate study program
at the University of Utah.

-1Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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II

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Court below dismissed plaintiff's
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action,
ruling that the use of age as a criterion for
evaluation of applicants violates no statutory or
constitutional provision.

III
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Amici support plaintiff's request for
relief in the form of a reversal of the judgment
and order of dismissal, a determination that
discrimination on the basis of age for admission to
a state educational institution is contrary to
various statutory and constitutional provisions as
a matter of law, and an order remanding this matter
with instructions for a full trial and hearing.

IV
STATENENT OF FACTS
Amici agree with plaintiff's statement of
the facts of the case.
-2-
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v
HJTEREST OF l\J'1ICI
This brief amici curiae has been filed by
Stipulation of the parties and Order of the court
dated September 6, 1977.
The Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens
is a private nonprofit advocacy organization organized in 1975 to identify senior citizen concerns
and advocate policy change to meet those concerns.
The National Retired Teachers Association and the
American Association of Retired Persons are affiliated
and jointly administered nonprofit corporations having
a combined membership of over 10,000,000 peo?le.

The above organizations support the propositio1
that age-based discrimination against older persons
is based on stereotyped notions of the capabilities
of older persons that are untrue.

Therefore the

amici believe that age-based discrimination in the
access to public education is irrational and in
violation of the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Constitutions of Utah and of the
United States.

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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VI
ARGUHE:JT
POINT I
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that educational opportunities,
if offered by a state, be made available free of
discriminatory criteria having no rational relationship to the state's legiti~ate educational goals.
The plaintiff's complaint, after alleging
that she was qualified for admission to the defendants'
institution for post-graduate study and that she was
rejected "for the sole reason" of her age, alleges
that the defendants:
.at all times pertinent to this action,
and now, maintain a policy of discrimination
against applicants for ad~issions to the
post-graduate degre6 prog=a~s of the Department of Educational ?s-_-~;'•clcgy on the basis
of age; giving pr~~erer
;~~ admissions to
the Department to young~r Jersons over older
persons.
(R.

3)

Based upon that allegation, which is true for present
purposes, the lower court held:
. . that the use of age as a criterion for
evaluation of applicants to educational
programs is not in violation of the equal
protection guarantees of the United States
Constitution.
.and is a reasonable
practice in light of the limited resources
available for educating persons in the
field of educational psychology at the
University of Utah; . .
(R.

91)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
-4- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In other words, according to the holding of the
lower court, the age-based admissions policy is so
remote from a constitutional problem that adversarial
factual investigation beyond the complaint is unnecessary; for reasons to follow, it will be shown that
the instant case does not lend itself to such a
facile disposition.
The rational basis test, distilled to its essence,
. requires only that the State's system be shown
to bear some rational relationship to legitimate
state purposes • .

San Antonio Independent School

District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S.l, at 40

(1973). Never-

theless, as the court in Bradley v. Vance, No. 76-0085
(D.D.C. 1977)

(a copy attached hereto), observed,

in a case involving age-based classifications affecting
employment of federal civil servants:

the

application of the 'rational basis standard' does not
require, though, judicial
p. 3.

abdication.

•

II

Id.

As the following cases illustrate, the latitude

accorded states, in structuring educational programs,
does not insulate them from the constitutional requirement that persons situated equally must be treated
equally.
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College rules requiring that certain classes
of students live on campus have been the source
of equal protection claims, with mixed results
depending upon the existence or nonexistence of a
reasonable relationship to legitimate educational
goals.

In Mollere v. Southeastern Louisiana College,

304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969), a college required
all girls under 21 to live in dormitories, unless
exceptions were granted, for the sole and avowed
purpose of paying off bond issues used to finance
the dormitories.

In holding that the policy violated

the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court stated:
.This is the type of irrational discrimination impermissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . Absent the special educational
considerations previously mentioned the support of the housing system is an obligation
which should fall on all students equally
just as does, for example, tuition . . . . To
select a group less-than-all, to fulfill an
obligation which should fall equally on all,
is a violation of equal protection no matter
how the group is selected.
304 F. Supp. at 828. 1
I While Mollere dealt with a sex-based classification, that fact did not figure in the decision;
even if it did, the rational basis test was, at the
time, still applicable to sex-based classifications.
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 u.s. 464 (1948). While the
matter is still not free from doubt, it appears
that, following Craig v. Boren, ____ U.S. ____ , 97
S. Ct. 451 (1976), sex-based classifications are
subjected to closer scrutiny by the court than is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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Likewise, in Cooper v. Nix, 343 F. Supp. 1101 (W.o.
La. 1972), the court invalidated, as unrelated to
any legitimate educational goal, a school policy
requiring all students to live on campus and exempting
students 23 years of age or older.

The Court held

that the classification embodied in the exemption
of students 23 years of age or over failed to measure
2
up to the rational basis criterion.

true under the traditional rational basis test. Prior
to Craig v. Boren, the rational basis test seems to
have been the vehicle for deciding cases involving
sex-based classifications. Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see Baltic Independent
School District v. South Dakota High School Activities
Assn., 362 F. Supp. 780 (D. S.D. 1973), and Cooper v.
Nix, 343 F. Supp.-1101 (W.O. La. 1972), which observed
that Reed v. Reed, supra, was predicated upon the
rational basis test~llowing Reed v. Reed, the
court in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973),
by virtue of a plurality and s1ngle justice concurring
opinion, appeared to go beyond the rational basis
test, but the court subsequently, in Kahn v. Shevin,
supra, returned to the more traditional standard.

2
Cooper v. Nix was reversed, in part, on ground~
unrelated to the above discussion and remanded with
directions to the lower court to recast the injunctive
relief granted. Cooper v. Nix, 496 F. 2d 1285
(5th Cir. 1974).
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The necessity of a rational correlation
between legitimate educational objectives and
classifications embodied in school policy was
emphasized in three other decisions involving
campus residency requirements which arrived at
different results because of different evidence.
In Prostrollo v. University of South Dakota,
507 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1974), Poynter v. Drevdahl,
359 F.Supp. 1137 (W.D. Mich. 1972), and Pratz v.
Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, 316 F. Supp. 872
(W.D. La. 1970), aff'd without opinion, 401 U.S.
1004

(1971), abundant and persuasive evidence was

produced by the respective institutions that dormitory living had educational advantages and that
those advantages were substantially diminished in
the case of older students, e.g., returning
veterans and married students living without their
spouses.

Based upon that proof, a rational con-

nection was ascertained between the classification
exempting older students from dormitory living and
the legitimate educational objectives of the schools;
however, as pointed out by the court in Prostrollo
v. University of South Dakota, supra, the result
was based upon that proof, and perhaps would have

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-8-

been different if the evidence showed that the sole
purpose of the requirement was to pay for bonds
issued to build the dormitories, citing Mollere v.
Southeastern Louisiana College, supra,

507 F. 2d

at 780.
The validity of a classification pursuant to
which the District of Columbia made funds available
for the extra-territorial education of handicapped
children and wards of D.C. courts in foster homes
outside the district, but for no other students,
despite an opportunity for integrated education
offered by a Maryland school system, occupied the
court in Bullock v. Washington, 468 F. 2d 1096
(D.C. Cir. 1972).

Finding that the D.C. school

system offered no educational opportunties for
handicapped children and that children in foster
homes outside the district possessed unique characteristics, logically distinguishing them from
students in general, the court upheld the classification.

However, it did emphasize that:

It is generally true, of course, that although
the District is not obligated to provide any
students with an extra-territorial education,
it must do so for all equally if it choooses
to do so for any. . . .
468 F.2d at 1106.
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Applying the same principle, the court in Baltic
Independent School District v. South Dakota High
School Activities Assn., 362 F. Supp. 780 (D. S.D.
1973), invalidated a policy which divided South
Dakota high schools into two classes, depending upon
population, for the purpose of debate competition; the
effect of the policy was to make national competition
available to two teams from the larger schools and
only one team from the smaller schools.

Finding that

the classification penalized students in the smaller
schools, with no corresponding educational justification,
.In order to comply with equal

the court stated:

protection requirements, there must be equality of
opportunity among people with similar qualifications.
362 F. Supp. at 785.

3

A final illustrative case is

Wittkamper v. Harvey, 188 F. Supp. 715 (M.D. Ga. 1960),
which considered the validity under the equal protection
clause of a policy of permitting the transfer of county
students to a city school system but excluding Mennonite
students for vague reasons related to peace and order.
In holding that the practice violated the Mennoite
students' rights under the equal protection clause, the
court stated:
3 The court also emphasized that eligibility
for scholarships can be affected by a student's
overall scholastic record, which could include participation in national debate competition. That point is
r~levant in the present case because, as will be shown
below, there is a demonstrable relationship between the
possession of a graduate degree and an individual's
earning ability.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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. . . [W]hen the City Board decides to accept
some students [from the county system] and
proceeds to accept some such students, the
City Board is then obligated under the law
to afford equal protection to all such students
desiring to transfer from the County to the
City school system. Such obligation exists
even though the County students have no right
to attend City schools, and even though transfer to the City system 'is merely a privilege
granted or withheld by [the City Board] at
its pleasure.'
.This is not to say, of
course, that the City Board may not impose
reasonable standards to be met before a transfer student will be accepted. Certainly the
City Board may require superior academic and
conduct records if it desires to do so. And
surely the City Board may limit the number of
transfer students it will accept. But the
City Board may not arbitrarily refuse to admit
a transfer student for 'any reason at all,
or for no reason' if it is admitting other
transfer students. Although the City Board
has a discretion, it is a legal discretion
which must be exercised in accordance with
theConstitution's requirement that all persons
be accorded equal protection.
188 F. Supp.
at 720-721.
The foregoing decisions illustrate that all
persons within the ambit of an educational program
are guaranteed by the equal protection clause equal
opportunities to participate in the program, whether
the program is optional or compulsory, i.e., whether
it is denominated a right or privilege.

The rule is

necessarily as applicable to a university offering
post~raduate

education as to a school district

gratuitously offering education programs to students
beyond the territorial sphere of its responsibility.
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While classifications creating exceptions or
special treatment are permissible under certain
circumstances, they must, under the Constitution,
be justified by a demonstrable relationship between
the classification and legitimate educational
objectives.
In the instant case, the plaintiff has
alleged that she is qualified in all respects for
admission to the defendants' post-graduate program,
that she was rejected solely because of her age,
and that the defendants maintain a policy of utilizing
age as a selection criterion.

The lower court's

order of dismissal precluded any evidentiary hearing
focused upon the particulars of that policy, the
age ranges which are utilized, the mechanics of the
selection process, and, most importantly, the
existence or non-existence of a legitimate educational
justification for the policy.

It is submitted that

the order is thus mainifestly erroneous and must be
reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT II
The Fqual Protection Clause and the Due Process
of the Fourteenth Amendment forbid policies and

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

practices which vest in individuals the power to make
arbitrary judgments, in granting or withholding ot
public benefits or privileges, unguided by ascertainabl
standards.
The sketchy record before the court reveals
that in the academic year of 1975 the plaintiff was
51 years old, that her application was rejected
because of her age, and that the lower court found
no constitutional infirmity " ... in light of the
limited resources available for educating persons
in the field of educational psychology.
Because of the lower court's summary disposition of
the case, we are not informed:
de~ision

1) who made the

to reject the plaintiff's application;

2) at what level the decision was reached; 3)

the

number of persons who participated in the decision
and their responsibilities; 4) whether the age of
51, or some earlier age, is the cut-off point;
5) whether the age-based decision is influenced by
the extent to which an applicant equals or exceeds
normal admissions requirements; 6) the resources
actually available to the Department of Educational
Psychology; 7) the qualificiations and

age~

of

successful applicants for the 1975 academic year;
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or 8)

whether any policies or regulations

governing admissions decisions have ever been
duly promulgated.

The list could go on,

but the foregoing suffices to illustrate the point
that, within the factual background before this
court, the denial of the plaintiff's application
could have been the result of an ad hoc, arbitrary
judgment by a single individual applying subjective
standards known to, and comprehended only by, himself.
In Wittkamper v. Harvey, supra, 188 F. Supp.
715 (M.D. Ga. 1960), a case discussed earlier, the
court invalidated a classification which excluded
Mennonite children from educational opportunities
under a reciprocal agreement between two school boards
and held, in part:
. But the City Board may not arbitrarily
refuse to admit a transfer student for 'any
reason at all, or for no reason' if it is
admitting other transfer students . . . 188
F. Supp. at 721. 4
Wittkamper v. Harvey, though dealing
4
with a classification based upon religion, did not
discuss the equal protection lssue with reference
to the First Amendment's guarantee of religious
freedom; rather, the court applied the traditional
rational basis equal protection analysis. Compare
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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The constitutional inhibition against the practice
of bestowing or withholding benefits through
arbitrary judgment with no definable standards is
illustrated in other contexts.

For example, while

no person has a constitutional right to purvey liquor,
and the receipt of a liquor license is merely a
privilege, it is a violation of equal protection of
the laws if everyone similarly situated is not treated
equally, free from arbitrary decisions granting or
withhnlding a license.

Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F. 2d

605 (5th Cir. 1964); Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control
Comm., 160 F. 2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947).

Again, in Holmes

v. New York Housing Authority, 398 F. 2d 262 (2nd Cir.
1968) , the court invalidated the New York Housing
Authority's policy of selecting, with no ascertainable
standards, public housing tenants from among applicants
far exceeding in number the available units.

The court

stated:
.It hardly need be said that the existence of an absolute and uncontrolled discretion
in an agency of government vested with the
administration of a vast program, such as
public housing, would be an intolerable invitation to abuse.
398 F. 2d at 265.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the
court, in holding that a student was entitled to a
pre-suspension hearing, observed that "

.The Clause
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requires at least these rudimentary precautions
against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct
and arbitrary exclusion from school."
at 481.

419 U.S.

While Goss v. Lopez involved a procedural

due process claim, as did Holmes v. New York
Housing Authority, supra, it would seem that the
due process clause and the equal protection
clause have been, and properly so, treated interchangeably by the courts when evaluating the legal
effect of arbitrary action.

The effect of arbitrary

decision-making, with no articulated standards, is
both to deprive an excluded individual of the equal
protection of the laws and to deprive him of the
5
opportunity for a meaningful hearing.
Even if it be assumed that some form of age
requirement is permissible under the equal protection
clause, its validity would necessarily rest upon
a demonstrable relationship to the University of
Utah's proper educational objectives.

Based upon

5 While the plaintiff's complaint speaks of
equal protection, the lower court's order held that
the programs in question violated neither the equal
protection guarantees of the United States Constitution
nor any other statutory or constitutional prohibition.
It is submitted that a due process claim is fairly
encompassed within the allegations of the complaint.
For examples of the interchangeability of equal protection concepts and due process concepts, compare
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the record now before this court, it is impossible
even to guess what those ends could be, but even
if that problem were overcome, it is still not
possible to determine whether the policy sustained
by the lower court is constitutional.

The reason,

of course, is that the vague and broad power to use
"age as a criterion" is equivalent to the limitless
power to make subjective judgments and then assign
age as a reason for turning away an otherwise
qualified individual.

If an official responsible

for the admissions decision dislikes an applicant
for reasons known only to himself, be that applicant
30, 35, 40, or 45 years of age, the application can
be denied because of age.

Moreover, in the absence

of standards that identify the particular disqualifyir
age or ages, there is no way to measure the policy
under the equal protection clause.

If the justificat]

for applying an age-based criterion were, e.g., to
avoid placing senile individuals in the graduate
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973), and Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89 (1965), with Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441 (1973), United States Department of Agriculture
v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), and Stanley v. Illinoi~
405 u.s. 645 (1972).
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program, an analysis would still be necessitated
to determine if there is a reasonable correlation
between the selected age and the incidence of
senility.

The record discloses no standards,

policies, or regulations concerning age or any
other criteria for making admissions decisions.
Defendants' brief (at 14-15) cites Beard v. Board
of Education North Summit School District, et al.,
81 Utah 51, 16 P. 2d 900 (1932), for the proposition
there is a presumption of reasonableness attached
to the acts of school administrators.

Defendants

ignore the portion of the quotation emphasized
by themselves linking the presumption discussed to
"a rule or regulation duly made."
of Education, supra, at 903.

Beard v. Board

Defendants have

promulgated no rules or regulations concerning
admissions decisions.

In short, the unfettered

discretion that the decision of the lower court
vests in the defendants clearly does not square
with either the equal protection clause or the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
ARGW1ENT
POINT III

No constitutionally sufficient justification
is conceivable for the age based class1fication ln
lSSUe.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The plaintiff is in her middle ages and
there is no suggestion in the record that she is
intellectually disqualified from the defendants'
post-graudate program.

Indeed, the stipulated facts

are that her credentials, educational background,
experience, and academic record "exceeded the normal
admissions requirements."

(R.3)

Aside from the

facts of the instant case, it is now free from
doubt that age, in and of itself, is no indicator of
6
.
1 a b'l'
learning and f unctlona
l
lty.

6 See Green, Age, Intelligence and Learning,
Industrial Gerontology,Winter 1972 (the Natlonal
Council on the Aging, Inc.), which reaches the
following conclusion, based upon an evaluation
of the relationship between advancing age and
declining learning ability:
Does I.Q. decline? Probably yes, sooner
or later, but much later than people had thought.
When does it become critical to performance?
For many people not until ages such as the 70's,
80's or even 90's.
In other words, we seem to
be over-endowed for most tasks we need to carry
out. We can absorb a lot of physical deterioration,
especially in the brain, because these losses do
not necessarily reduce our normal functioning
range.
In fact, there is reason to believe that
if measurable decline appears before age 60, then
some disease of or substantial injury to the central
nervous system must have been incurred.
Fortunately, the organs of the body are overbuilt
in the sense that they can perform more than is
ordinarily demanded, at least until age 65 in
almost everyone, and even after that in most people.
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In recent years many educational institutions
have created special programs to encourage the
enrollment of older citizens in undergraduate
programs.

Indeed, older students comprise the

most rapidly increasing segment of the college
population.
The largest rate of increase in college
enrollments have occured among persons
who are above the traditional age for
college attendance. The numbers of
persons enrolled in college rose between
1970 and 1976 by 80 percent for those
persons 25 to 29 years old and by
96 percent for those 30 to 34 years
old. This compares with a rise of
about 32 percent for those in their
early twenties and 13 percent for
persons 18 and 19 years old. The
number of college students 35 years old
and over rose by 406,000, or 52 percent;
between 1972 (when enrollment data for this
age group were collected) and 1976. Thus,
in 1976 one-fourth of all college students
were 25 years old and over, with a majority
of these students attending college parttime.
U.S. Bureau of the Census,
#307, April 1977 at 20.
This trend reflects a general re-orientation
of American society toward opening up new life and
career options in mid-life:
The return to school of many adults in the
middle years is a dramatic manifestation
of the changing structure and quality of
these years. Middle age is no longer
necessarily a period of hopes abandoned
and reconciliation prior to entering old
age.
It has become a period of new options
that can provide an increasing number of
men and women with new opportunities for
developing new sources of satisfaction and
meaning.
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Dale L. Heistand, Changing Careers After 35: New
Horizons Through Professional and Graduate Stuay(1971) at xii.
But decisions determining the admission of
students to degree programs in higher education
impose barriers against older students.

Decisions

to deny older students admission to these programs
are far too common.

Unlike admission processes affecti

undergraduate programs, which are often based upon
routinized, objective standards, the graduate
admission process is decentralized, and, as is clear
from the case at bar, not subject to uniform standards.
Selection of standards varies not merely from
institution to institution, but from department
:.c department within a university.

Id. at 57.

These

arbitrary, standardless processes create a barrier to
the vindication of equal protection rights by older
citizens.

The most significant barrier is the discriminator:

attitude held by department chairmen and other universi:
officials involved in the admissions process.

Perhaps

the argument that is most essential to discriminatory
decisions is the "investment notion":

graduate

education is viewed as an investment in a student's
potential earnings capacity, or as defendants' brief

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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puts it, they wish "to maximize the benefits to
the state." (at 17)

Such an investment in an

older student is believed to yield fewer dividends
in the market place.

Assuming arguendo that there

is a foundation to the "investment notion," it is
surely impermissible for an institution of higher
education to qualify a citizen's equal protection
right based upon a factor that in no way relates to
academic qualifications.

Since women, Blacks,

and Chicanos may be correctly predicted to have less
earnings potential than white males, the same
construct would justify arbitrary decisions to
limit their access to higher education.
Interviews with approximately 60 university
officials including presidents, deans, admissions
directors, and department chairpersons, by Columbia
University's Conservation of Human Resources
Project reveals much about the barriers confronting
older students seeking admission to graduate programs.
Individuals involved in admissions review claim that
it is difficult to assess an older student's
academic background.

Admission officials may

limit entry to a graduate program to older students,
especially those over 50, only if they are "very
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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superior."

"Older applicants tend to be 'guilty

unless proven innocent' of a variety of shortcomings."

Some faculty members believe that older

students are "unrealistic" in their reasons for
wanting to attend graduate school; they appear to
believe that older students want the prestige
of graduate studies!

Heistand, supra. at 63-65.

Older applicants do not appear to be judged
by a clear, precise admissions criteria.

"Each

person involved in the admissions process tends to
impose his own perhaps idiosyncratic standards."
Id. at 56.
The

preble~

of age discrimination in college

admlssions is not unlike other forms of age-based
discrimination; an older person is too often judged
not on his/her ability to do a particular task
but on the prevailing notion that increasing age
means decreasing capability.

"The inexorable

passage of time is deemed prima facie evidence of
incompetence .... "

Note, "Too Old to Work;

The

Constitutionality of Mandatory Retirement Plans,"
44 So. Cal. L. Rev. 150, 179,

(1971).

The use of an age-based criterion in a
graduate program by its nature relates directly
to occupational opportunities and salary levels.
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Given the institutional commitment of the State of
Utah and the federal government to the employment
of workers at least until the age of 65,

7

the use

of an age-based criterion in a graduate program is
antagonistic to current public policy.
In point of fact, the discriminatory admissions
policy, far from being a reasonable means to accomplish
a legitimate governmental end, actually visits
an economic, employment-related penalty upon those
very citizens protected by laws forbidding age-based
employment discrimination.

According to available

findings, the presence of a masters degree can make
a difference of as much as 48% in earnings in the noneducational field.

S

7 The federal Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §621, et seq., which applies to both
public and private employers, 29 U.S.C. §§630, 633a,
and its Utah counterpart, 4B Utah Code Ann. §§34-35-6
and 34-35-3(5), prohibit age-based employment discrimination against persons between the ages of 40
and 65.
Both the House and the Senate are considering
legislation which would liberalize the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and it is likely
that soon the protect1ons of the Act will extend to
employees of state governments and those in private
industry at least through the age of 70. Congressman Claude Pepper has authored H.R. 5383, which would
have that effect, and on September 27, 1977, it passed
the house by a 359 to 4 vote.
8 Table I shows the average monthly starting
salarv for recent graduates in four selected fields
and Table II shows both beginning salaries for public
school teachers and average salaries of public school
teachers as affected by the presence or absence of a
post-graduate degree.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated -24OCR, may contain errors.

Average Monthly Starting Salary For Pecent Graduates
1977
Average Monthly Average Monthly
Starting Salary Starting Salary
w/B.A.
w;'r-1.A.

Difference
Monthly

Difference
Yearly

Percentage
Difference

$188.00
200.00
239.00
544.00
453.00

$2,256.08
2,400.00
2,868.00
6,528.00
5,436.00

15%
18
22
58
48

FIELD

Engineering
Accounting
Other Technical Fields*
Business Admin. Fields

I
N

lfl

I

$1,242.00
1,067.00
1,076.00
932.00

$1,430.00
1,267.00
1,315.00
** 1,476.00
*** 1,385.00

* Chemistry Math/Statistics
** Techinical Undergraduate Degree
*** Non-Technical Undergraduate Degree
Source:

Frank S. Endicott, The Endicott P.eport (1976),
TABLES 4, 5
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TABLE THO

Beginning Salaries for Public School Teachers

1975-76

Salary
Bachelor's Degree
l1aster 's Degree
Ph.D.

8,768.00-......._
9,979.oo./'
11,413.00

Percentage
Difference

12%
~30"'
>ly
0

Average Salaries of Public School Teachers

1975-76

Salary
Bachelor's Degree or less 10,976.00
Master's Degree or higher 13,702.00

Per::::entage
Difference

25%

Source:
National Education Association, "Status of
the American Public School Teacher, 1975-76, •· (in
pre£s, 1977).
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Thus, the admissions criterion goes beyond
mere disparate treatment among identically situated
individuals, which alone is a denial of equal
protection, and perpetuates a form of discrimination
now condemned by current public policy.
VII
CONCLUSION
By no stretch of the imagination can the
decision of the lower court stand.

While the

defe11dants have a legitimate interest in allocating
scarce resources consistently with proper educational
objectives, the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that identically situated
residents of the State of Utah be treated equally.
If the classification pursuant to which the plaintiff
was excluded is tested by the rational basis
test, it is a matter of pure conjecture on the present
record what rational basis the defendants are relying
upon.

The stipulated facts are that plaintiff was

denied admission to the defendants' post-graduate

3 The American Federation of Teachers, AFLCIO, "Survey of Teachers' Salaries, 1975-76," cite
somewhat higher salary statistics illustrating an
even greater salary difference between the two
degrees.
The mean salary for a classroom teacher
with a Bachelor'3 Degree and one with a Master's
Degree is computed at $14,804.00 and $17,130.00
respectively--a difference of $2,325.00 annually .
.l'unerican Federation of Teachers ''cFL-CIO, "Survey
of Teachers' Salaries 197 5-7G," \'lashing ton, D. C.
Hay 1977.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-27-errors.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain

program solely because of her age, and while the
plaintiff's age is alleged in the complaint, the
record does not elucidate the specific details of
the defendants' exclusionary policy or the mechanices
of its implementation.
to evaluate the legal

It is utterly impossible
signific~ance

of the exclusionary

policy under the Fourteenth Amendment without further
factual exposition.
Moreover, even if some form of age-based
exclusionary policy could be shown to satisfy the
relevant constitutional standards, there is no way
the policy in the instant case could measure up;
it vests in the defendants the unfettered discretion,
unguided by any objective standards, to make arbitrary
judgments, to the demonstrable economic detriment
of those who are rejected.
Therefore, it is respectfully urged that the
decision of the lower court be reversed and that the
Court rule as a matter of law that there is no constitut~onally

sufficient justification for the age-based

classification in question, remanding the cause for a
full trial.
DATED this

{0 -rj,_day

of

+&~t~:__----"---'---'

19 77.

Of Counsel:
Alfred Hiller
Robert B. Gillan
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v.
CY2US

Civil Action No.
R.

76-0085

- i
:-ILE;:J

Vi~UCP.,

Secretary of State,
ET J\L.,

Defendants.

JAi,:ES F. D.'.VEY, C!erk
Before ROBB, Circuit Judqe, GESELL, District
and

FLAN~JERY,Dist=ict

Jud~~,

Judqe.

NEt'-10~2\:,JDU~t

This case presents the question whethe=
requirad

statu~orily

retirement at age sixty for those persons covered

by the Foreign Service Retirenent System (''Foreign Service
guarant~es

personnel") violates the equal protection
in the Fifth .'<mendrnent. Y

Pl2intiffs are Foreign Service

Officers who were or will be forced into
si~ty

e:!lbodied

and an organizat1on whose

ret1re~en~

rne~bersh1~

inclu~2s

at age
such

officers.
They seek declaratory and i~junctlve re!:ef.
This
2/
matter comes before the Court on defendants' motion to disrr.iss-'
or for Su..Tlunar-y judgment and plaintiffs' opposition t!"lere'to.

At

oral argu.;;Jent plaintif:: cross-moved for SUfi\..':l.ary judglilent, but
indicated

th~t

the record.

defend2nts could not prevail withou't

supple~en~i~;

Defendants indicated a willingness for the

c~se

to

.!_/

Plaintiffs originally had other claims Hhich \.Jere presented
to a single Distric't Judge.
The first, a contention that the

mandato~y ret1rement ~gc viol~ted the Aqe Discrimin3~lon in
Emolo~~ent Act, 22 U.S.C. § 633a,
Executive Order 11141,3 C.f.g.
§ 179:
and C1vil ServJ..ce requlu.tions, \.;as dismisse:::. on de.:12r:de;:1-:s'
mot1or..
418 F. Su:Jp. 64 (l97G).
A related cla1r:t ·.:3s dis:ni~s~'i

by Court Order on July ~7. 1976, and a claim o~ d~scr~mina~10~
in the appllc~t~on of the ret1rcrnen~ age was d~sm1ssea by
St1pulat1on of counsel on October 14, 1976.
2/

Defend~~~s

initiall~·

arqucd that the F ~th Ame~~~ent docs ~o-:

'il~pl:-· ~o:::~L:::'O:' f'l.Jl~':i ~ls he:.~·(' r:o prO?C'rty
n~crcst ar.:i bec:w~~
th'C:'~' =;l'l:l0t c:-rZ!ll~nsr· c-r pnrtlOrr o: a ::--.tctu c undc-:- •...-:~ich t.h~y

h..J'.rc :-c=c>:..v.-·n s~:.b.so:.:n:.12.l bene:lt..5.
m -~

Th~se

contcnciCJ;".::: have r.c

1 .:. : .
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dcc.ld~.o.'d

b..:!

on tilC' c>:i..:.t.l.IICJ

!:"

_·cunl.

1

F0lluh·1r:g ordl

Jrr_;u11'!n~

the p.1 rtlL:S \:ere g1vc:n an OfJflOrtunity to sutr:1it ,-JrjcJlt.l0nu.l
evidence, and both s1Jc!. J1d so.
Section 632 of thL
as

.:~mended,

St~tcs

22 U.S.C.

Inforn~t1on

§

1002,

Agency

International Development

For~.lgn
~~undutc:;

Service:

Ac~

o~

1g~6,

rct.:.rc::1c.:-nt <lt .Jge

(''USIA''), and the Agency £or
(''AID'')

.1/

Generally,

e~ployees

o£

the Federctl Government need not retire at such an early age.
Those employees covered by the Civil Service

("Civil Service

personnel'') do not face mandatory retirement until age seventy.
5 U.S.C.

§

8335.

Plaintiffs

claim that Congress has drawn an

unla~·Jfu.l dis tinction by set.ting a lower retirement age for
4/
Foreign Ser"lCe personnel than for Civil Serv1ce personnel.-

Since neither ''fundamental'' rights. nor ''suspect'' classes are
involved here,

the distinction betvleen Civil Service and Foreign

Service employees is prop2r if there is a rational basis to
suppo=~

U.S.

l

(1976).

it.

San Antonio Ind. School Oist. v. Rodriouez,

(1973);

Nass. Bd. of Retirement v. Hurgia,

Thus the

si~ple

411

427 U.S.

307

issue presented here is whether the

conditions of Foreign Service work are sufficiently different

Y

Any "participant" in the Foreign Service Retirenent and.
Disability System, who is not a career ambassador or a chie£
of mission, must retire at age sixt~' unless the Secretary
makes a special deter~ina~ion to '~aive retirement for f1ve
years.
See 22 U.S.C. § 1002.
Those "part.icipants" are:

{1) Foreign Service Officers;
(2}
Foreign Service Rese=ve
Officers with unlimited tenure (whether serv1ng in State
Department or USIA);
(3) Fore1gn Service Informat1on Officers;
(4)
Foreign Service Staff officers and employees with unlimited
appointments (whether serving 1n State Department or USIA) ;
an~
{5) Personnel serving in AID who have unlim1ted Fore1qn Service
Reserve or Staff appo1nL~ents or who are serving under
Presidential appointment and meet certa1n other qualificatio~s.
~/
This claim raises an issue about the laufulness of forced
retirc~ent between the ages of s1xtv and seventy, i.e., the
difference between the C1v1l Servic~ and the Forei~n-Service.
Pl~intiffs also claim sect1on 632 discrimin~tes bct:;een those
who have redchcd ~ge sixt~· and those who are younge~.
This
second cl~im r31Se$ ~n add1t1on~l 1ssue about tnc lawfulness
of forc~d rct1~0~en~ ~t 2ne st·vc~t·.· ~nd ~b~ve.
Defendants h~V~

gfy~~;:;~ (j~g~~i~:tP~~~~~~:~,,~;,:i ;~~:~;;~~:~,s ~; ~g~g ~ ~: rc

£.1:-~.
':'hu~ (: .. ~·~·:lrl~n:::,... r1.r't" C'l:.::.>.:_~,~.J t':l ~.:... ......__"'l,Jry JlL.L;~e:lt as to
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frc;1

c::nd~tl.o;--,:..; Cl: C.lvi.l

Ll1l:'

rctirc;:-:cnl .Jge lS rutlOnJl.

Serv1c1..~ \.Jorh.
~-

l·lu~-c;Iu,

:..;o

th<J.t thl.!

suorZJ ut n.

b..JTl.l£!,:

8.

The:

ZJ0Plic.Jtion of the ''rational basis stundard'' does not require,
thougl1,

JUdlci.Jl

l~gislatively

abdic~tion.

It simply nc3~= tt1at the

drawn dtstinct1on is presumptively valid, and

that its challengers have a heavy

burd~n

iil

provi~g

On the record cs~ablishcd in this case,

invalldity.

its
the

early mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service personnel
cannot survive even this most ninimal scrutiny.
The Government presents two explanations £or the
retirement age distinction.

It first says that the mandatory

retirer:-.ent age is rationally related to its interest in

creating udvancement opportunities for younger people.
However, an interest in recruiting and promoting younger
people solely because of their youth is inherently
discriminatory and cannot provide a legitimate basis for the
statutory scheme.

Furthermore~

there is no obvious reason why

such a rationale \Vould not equally applr -::o the Civil Service 1
and defendants have presented none.
The second rationale is that
personnel~

Fore~s~

Ser~lce

unlike Civil Service personnel, tend to work

overseas and they face,
psychological

therefore, unusual physical and

dif~iculties.

Sixty year olds are said not to

have the vitality necessary to carry out overseas assigr.rr.ents,
particularly in ''hardship posts,"due to the inhere~t effects
of ageing and the cumulative effects of a career spent in
foreign lands.

Furthermore, the Government contends that

upon reaching age si::-:ty people are more likely to need medical
atten~ion,

which is often lacking in

fore~gn

posts.

The record compiled in this case conclusively
est2blishes that Civil Service and other Government person~el
work overseas in positions and locations com?arable to those
o! Forciq~ Serv1cc personn~l, ~ithout facing forced rctirc~ent
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worl:lrHJ for tile Government. uvC?rsc:Js.

t1orc:

·v:e~~

than 38,000

st.::tt1.oned in foreign countr1.es,

und .J.bot..:t 20,000 were 1.n tne

Un1.ted States Trust Terrl.lOrlcS

(~-~-'

Island))/

Panama,

Sarno~.

Wake

Only 4, 737 of these Government e01;:>loyees fuccd

mandatory retirement at

~ge

sixty.

Thus, less than ten percent

of the American civilians who work overseas for the

are forced to retire at age

Govern~ent

sixty.~

Not only are there substantial numbers of Americans
working abroad not subject to early retirement;

many of these

people have jobs similar to those of Foreign Service personnel.

The Foreign Service organizations(State

Depar~ent,

USIA, AID)

had 7,792 American civilian employees working abroad in

November, 1976.

Ho\.;ever, many of these employees have Civil

Service status and the right to v1ork until age seventy.

In

fact, almost forty percent of the Americans \·Jho work overseas
for the Foreign Service agencies are subject to Civil Se=vice
retirement.

In addition, AID often has its work performed on

a contr.Jct: basis by employees of other departments or agencies
such as the

Depart~ent

Engineers.

These

of Agriculture and the Corps of

e~ployees,

of course, may work until seventy.

AID also contracts with private United States organizations to
carry out much of its actual technical work.

Employees of

these organizations are not required to retire at age sixty
and quite

co~~only

serve above that age.

Foreign Service personnel are unique

i~

Nor is it true that
having to handle

assignments to unusually difficult posts or "hardship" posts.

5/ The Government has contended that it is the diffic:ultv of
living and working abroad that makes Foreign Service workdistinctive. Any such difflculty should be equ~lly prcs2nt in
the Tru.;t Territories which, like forelgn countries, may be
considered "hardship posts" fo::- Governmen~ em?loyees.
See 5
U.S.C. § 5941.
Thus, it seems approprlate for comparison
purposes to consider employe~s worklng ln Trust Territories in
the same category as those working in foreign count=ics.
I t those people worl.1ng ~r. Trust Terr1tor1cs arc c':cluded
rrom the: calc•JLJtlon, th-:: pc.rce:1::ua~ of tn':l~' fac1nq carl:
only r~s~s to uhou~ twelve and one-half pc::-cent.

§/

retlre~en~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

~t~tluned

~lrro~t

exclus1vely in undurdcv0lopcd areas of the

world.

FLI~the=more,

often

lrJc among

~nd

unlike Fure1gn Service pcrsonn2l, t!1ey

the poorE::st SE:}r.J.ents of

thr~

local PD?lll:Jcr..!
Thes~

face an}' adverse condit1ons tl1at reny ex1st.

assignments

~re

obviously as taxing and strenuous as Foreign

Service assignnents.

Yet,

there is no upper age limit at all

for Peace Corps volunteers.

Affidavits indicate that many

Peace Corps volunteers are,

in fact, over nge sixty, and that

there has been no noticeable pro8lem vri th medical services.

it is clear that Civil Service personnel also \Vork

Finally,

7/

in ''hardship posts''.-

Thus plaintiffs have convincingly

shown that reaching age sixty is itself no bar to
employment overseas.

The vast majority of

Govern~ent

American~

working

abroad for the Government do not face early retirer.-oe;"lt,
although their work may be similar in all relevant =cspccts
to that

perfor~ed

by Foreign Service personnel.

There remains,

though,

~,e

Government

that Foreign Service personnel are unique in that

c~~tention
~he~·

s?en~

significant portions of their careers abroad, und that this
has a cu:nulative ii7l,?act so that by age si:-:ty they are generally
incapable of effective service.

In essence the

Gove~r.ment

says

that while non-Foreign Service personnel serve abroaC, they do
not follow careers overseas.

Plaintiffs, through discovery,

attempted to compile a statistical comparison of time spent
abroad by Foreign Service personnel and by other
employees.

Gover~~e;"lt

Defendants uere unable to provide this data

because of the nature of their recordkeeping systems.

Thus

plu1ntiffs h~ve sub~itted the first ten pages of the State
8/
Department's Bioqraohic Renistcr- for June, 1974 (t~e last

7/

7he record does not allow a comparison betv:cen the nu..-:-:ber
s~rv1ce und Forc1gn Serv1cc
personnel serving in

~f Civil

''n2r~~hl?

~o~ts."

R.' ''~he o: 0 .-~,~hic P=c1~t0~ p~ovides conc1se bio~ra?h c
Sponsored byl~'f.CJr:-n._,r·(·~the S.J. Quinney Law~:;-:,-..-.-::s8~.:~0l-----o?"
Library. Funding for digitization
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Jnd
n llc·r
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Technology Act,inadministered
by the of
Utah foreiCJ-:1
State Library.:'! :,j:._rs."
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Machine-generated
OCR, may
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-(,-

d.:..s.t~

for

exhibit..

\VhlC!i

1t

is cJVJ.Llo:Olc)

<Jnd

CJ.rl

uttd:"lic.:d o:-::pl.:.::-~uto:-;·

Of the' t\venty-f.:..vc ForclQ:l Scr"JlC:!

in thC'se ten p.Jge!s \vho v1ere over o.c__F::!

:

ifty,

O:f.::.ccr~

length of time spent overseas wa~ fifteen y~<..~rs

averuge length of time spent in the Service
States was ten years.

11:-J'.:.',·j

the uvc-r21g'=

1n

2nd the

the Un1tcd

As a comparison plaintlffs have also

submitted pages from the Biograph1c Register containing the
names of thirteen Civil Service employees o£ the Agriculture
Departr.l.ent 1 s Foreign Service who are over age fifty and an

attached explanatory exhibit.

The average length of time

spent overseas by these Civil Service employees \Vas 11.2

years and

2n

average of eight years was spent in the Service

in the t ni ted St::J.tes.
1

The Court does not find this

difference in time spent overseas significant.

Several other

exhibits also indicate that there are many Americans in the
Civil Service pursuing careers overseas in the same way that
Foreign Service personnel do.
The Government has made no attempt to counter the
above showing.

It merely maintains that since at any given

time a far hisher proportion of Foreign Service personnel are
serving overseas than are Civil Service personnel, the system
is rational.

It is, of course,

true that a statute is not

unlawful merely because it creates an
Dandridae v. l-li11ia.'11s,

397 U.S. 471,

imperfec~

485

(1970).

classification.
If only a

small number of personnel working overseas escaped the
sixty-year age limit, the Government • s point would be \vell
taken.

However, we are faced with a situation where tens of

thousands of Americans are working for the United States
Government overseas and only a tiny percentage are singled
out for early retirement.

Yet this small group does not

appear to serve under any more difficult conditions than the
others, nor do they seem to serve for a significantly longer
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per~oJ

o!

t1~~-

irr.l.tlon.1l.2/

Th1~

s~·stcn1

1~

patent!)'

~rb1tr~ry

un~

Tnus pluint1ff::;' l7lOtlon for sufiUTlary Jud:;ment

GJ2 of the Fore1gn Service hct is hereby declared
unconst1tutio~al

Service

and void.

retirc~ent

Participants in the Foreign

and disability system cannot be

to automatic retirement until age seventy.

is not foreclosed from redraHir.g the statutory

eliminate

~,e

~ubject

Of course,Conqrcss
scher.~~

to

arbit=ary classifications now existing and

im?osing any rational mandatory retirement age.

This decision

does not affect those pLovisions of the Foreign Service Act

which set forth retirement benefits

o= alternative means of

retirel7le>lt, Hhether voluntary or involuntary.
The claims of the individual plaintiffs £or back
pay and

reins~atemen~

must be reviewed.

to confer in light of this
form of order within
pay and

t'l.-10

opini~n

Counsel are directeC

and submit an

app~opriate

weeks resolving the claims for back

reinstate~ent.

Each

pRr~y

shall bear its own costs anci fees.

United States

Circu~t

Judge

United States District Judge

0--ft..(_:-v-"-'~- 0-'~~'-'
UniteG States

June 28,

Dlstr~ct Jud~c

1977.

The coverr:n1ent 1s contention that it need not make everyone
1n th~ c~v1l sc~v1.ce ret1re at age sixty because of those .
rt;:la"'::.l.vcly fe.·J civ1l servants \lho serve abroud is non secr:..J.!.tU!'.
The lS:3ue 1s \·.'~H~'thc::- the mandatO!"j' ret1.rcm::nt c:u;w ir.:;;oscC on
For21gn Su~vi=~ ~~=~o~ncl c~n be d2omed ration~! in ll~~t o£
Sl'.::uu~ion
~: o:-_hcr
..-.m,:..r!c.:ms
are
\·.·ork1ng
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